What is behind Iran’s refusal to negotiate its nuclear and ballistic missile programs?

On Sunday, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araqchistated that Tehran will not give in to the demand of the president of the United States, Donald Trumpto renounce uranium enrichment, “even if a war is imposed on us.”

SEE ALSO: Iran’s warning to the US that once again turns on the alert of an all-out war in the Middle East

Two days before, Iran and the United States held indirect negotiations in Oman. Both parties described the meeting as positive.

USA requires that a new nuclear deal with Iran must include the limitation of ballistic capabilities of the Islamic Republic and the cessation of its support to the Axis of the Resistancearmed groups hostile to Israel.

Besides, trump has deployed a large military force in the Persian Gulf, with the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln to the head.

Araqchi maintained that The continuation of the negotiations will depend on the seriousness shown by Washington.

“The continuation of some sanctions and certain movements in the military sphere naturally raises doubts about the level of seriousness and preparation of the counterparty. We are observing and evaluating all these signals”he stated.

According to the EFE agency, Araqchi reacted this way after the White House special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner They visited the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln near Iranian waters, which was understood as a threat.

Furthermore, shortly after Friday’s negotiations, trump signed an executive order establishing an additional 25% tariff on products from countries that purchase, import or otherwise acquire goods or services from Iran.

Washington also announced new sanctions against 14 ships of the so-called Iranian “ghost” fleet.15 entities—based in India or Türkiye, among others—and two individuals associated with the marketing of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products.

Araqchi stressed on Sunday that in Oman the only issue that was addressed was the Iranian nuclear program, leaving the issue of ballistic missiles and Tehran’s support for the Axis of Resistance off the table.

He indicated that Iran could consider “a series of confidence-building measures regarding the nuclear program,” in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions.

Regarding the US military deployment, he said that this does not intimidate Iran.

“Ballistic rocketry is today Iran’s main defensive tool”

According to a analysis of satellite images cited by The New York TimesIran is prioritizing the repair of its ballistic missile manufacturing and launching sites that were damaged during last year’s June 12 Day War. Many of these centers—including strategic facilities related to long-range missiles— They already show signs of active repair and resumption of operations.

What this suggests is that Tehran is emphasizing its conventional and strategic missile capabilities as a deterrence tool in the face of possible future military actions by Israel or the United States.

In contrast to the rapid repair of missile installations, Reconstruction of major nuclear sites has been much slower or minimal. Key locations that were attacked during the war—such as Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan— continue largely inoperative or with limited reconstruction observable from space.

According to the defense and intelligence analyst Andrés Gómez de la Torrethe current position of Iran facing USA and its allies must be read in light of a profound change in its deterrence structure. According to the United States National Security Strategy, published at the end of last year, North American security agencies consider that Iran’s nuclear program has been “significantly downgraded.”

In this scenario, explains Gómez de la Torre, Iranian deterrence no longer relies on its conventional warfare capabilityseverely hit after the Israeli and American attacks, but in three key vectors: nuclear technological development, ballistic missile program and the expansion of its drone fleet. “After the latest military operations carried out by Israel, Iran’s conventional capabilities – especially its air defense system – were practically degraded”he maintains.

The two military actions that marked this turning point were the US operation “Midnight Hammer”, in June 2025, directed against three nuclear facilities; and the Israeli “Lion Crescent” offensive, launched that same month. Unlike the North American attack, focused exclusively on nuclear infrastructure, Israel deployed a broader operation that combined bombings of strategic installations with attacks on high-value targets, including senior commanders linked to the Revolutionary Guard, air defense systems and ballistic missile and drone factories, with a strong sabotage and intelligence component.

For Gómez de la Torre, this new balance explains the “entrapment” of the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States. Tehran is willing to explore middle ground, but maintains two clear red lines. The first is uranium enrichment: Iran agrees to limit it, but rejects zero enrichment outright. The second—and more sensitive—is its ballistic missile program, which it considers indispensable.

“Ballistic rocketry is the core business of Iranian deterrence,” says the analyst. Together with drones, it constitutes the regime’s main defensive tool against IsraelUS bases and Washington’s allies in the region, in a context in which their conventional armed forces, especially the air force and air defense, today lack effective response capacity.

From this perspective, the current talks can be interpreted both as a delaying tactical dialogue and as part of a “tug-of-war” process to reach partial compromises. Limiting uranium enrichment as much as possible could represent a victory for the United States, but The great obstacle continues to be the ballistic missile program, the true backbone of Iranian deterrence after the military attrition suffered in recent years.

“Washington is pressing to see how far Tehran can give in”

The international journalist and analyst Carlos Novoa maintains that the dialogue between Iran and the United States should be understood, for now, as a tactical exchange rather than a substantive negotiation. In his opinion, Tehran is trying to avoid directly addressing the most sensitive issues on its strategic agenda, while Washington measures how far it can exert pressure to force concessions.

Novoa states that this dynamic also responds to President Trump’s negotiating style, who usually starts from maximum positions and then gradually retreats in search of an intermediate point. “The United States is going to apply maximum pressure and then let go,” explains, noting that if the pressure intensifies, Iran he could be forced to discuss issues that he considers untouchable today.

In this sense, the analyst emphasizes that the uranium enrichment and the ballistic missile program They constitute the core of Iran’s defensive capability. It is, he affirms, the main deterrence and response tools that Tehran has in the face of possible external aggression, in a highly volatile regional context.

Novoa remembers that Iran has already shown some flexibility in this area in the pastas occurred during the administration of Barack Obamawhen it accepted limits on its nuclear program. However, he clarifies that the current scenario is very different: the geopolitical pressure from the great powers is greater and the margin for purely diplomatic agreements is narrower.

Still, consider that there is room for partial negotiation. Although the ayatollah regime is weakened after internal revolts, it maintains a firm stance in defense of its strategic capabilities, he says. At the same time, Novoa points out that Washington is not seeking a collapse of the Iranian regime, but rather a most advantageous position in strategic termswhich opens the door to eventual understandings without a total break in dialogue.