In the midst of the military escalation in the Middle East, in A scenario that until recently seemed extreme is analyzed: send special forces to to take control of its nuclear material and remove it from the country. The operation, still in the discussion phase, would seek confiscate highly enriched uranium to prevent it from becoming an atomic weapon. But how viable is a mission of this type and what risks would it entail?

Until before 12 day war who faced Israel with Iran in June of last year, and which had the key intervention of the United States, it was known that The Islamic Republic had managed to accumulate 450 kilos of uranium enriched to 60%. It was close to the 90% enrichment that is needed to have the nuclear weapon.

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With 450 kilos of uranium enriched to 90%, Iran could have manufactured about 11 atomic bombs.

Today it is not known with certainty where are the 450 kg of uranium enriched to 60% from Iranand precisely that uncertainty is one of the reasons why the United States would be considering an operation to locate and seize it.

This satellite image courtesy of Vantor, taken on March 1, 2026, shows a view of the Natanz nuclear complex facilities, Isfahan province, Iran. (AFP).

This satellite image courtesy of Vantor, taken on March 1, 2026, shows a view of the Natanz nuclear complex facilities, Isfahan province, Iran. (AFP).

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By reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Israeli and American intelligence, the more concrete clue points to the nuclear complex Isfahanone of the main centers of the Iranian nuclear program.

IAEA reports indicate that part of the highly enriched uranium was stored in an underground area of ​​this complex.

After the air raids USA June last year, with huge bunker buster bombs, some reports indicate that the material could have been buried under damaged structures at that site.

However, the material could also have been in Fordow or Natanzthe main uranium enrichment centers of Iran which are also underground.

The Fordow uranium enrichment plant in Iran on June 19, 2025 (above), and following the US attacks on the site on June 22, 2025. (AFP).

The Fordow uranium enrichment plant in Iran on June 19, 2025 (above), and following the US attacks on the site on June 22, 2025. (AFP).

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Another possibility is that Iran moved uranium to a secret location before or during last year’s attackswhich today keeps his whereabouts uncertain.

Regarding the plan being discussed, the Axios portal reported that The operation would involve special forces physically entering fortified or underground nuclear facilities within Iran.

Axios stated that it is not yet clear whether it would be a US, Israeli or joint mission.

He added that It will likely occur only after both countries are certain that the Iranian military can no longer pose a serious threat. for the forces involved.

He recalled that on Tuesday of last week, in a briefing before the United States Congress, the Secretary of State was asked Marco Rubio whether Iran’s enriched uranium would be secured. “They will have to go look for him”he said, without specifying who.

The uranium enrichment process. (AFP).

The uranium enrichment process. (AFP).

While an Israeli defense official told Axios that trump and his team are seriously considering sending special operations units to Iran for specific missions.

Another US official said the administration has discussed two options: remove material from Iran completely or bring in nuclear experts to dilute it on site.

For Axios, last year’s attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities They buried the uranium reserves under rubble. He added that since then not even the Iranians themselves have been able to access them.

The attacks also destroyed almost all of the centrifuges of Iranand there is no evidence that enrichment has resumed.

How is enriched uranium transported?

The then president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, visiting the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, on April 8, 2008. (Photo by HO / IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE WEBSITE / AFP).

The then president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, visiting the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, on April 8, 2008. (Photo by HO / IRAN’S PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE WEBSITE / AFP).

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Moving highly enriched uranium is neither an improvised nor exclusively military task. The movement of this type of nuclear material is subject to very strict international protocols and transportation technologies designed to avoid radioactive leaks, accidents or sabotage attempts.

The specific and general rules that regulate these operations are established by the IAEA. These rules define everything from the type of containers authorized to the security, monitoring and emergency response procedures during the transfer.

In technical terms, enriched uranium is usually stored and transported in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆)a chemical compound used in the enrichment process inside centrifuges. For transport, the material is solidified and sealed inside special metal cylinders. These cylinders, in turn, are placed in certified shipping containersdesigned to resist severe impacts, fires and even immersion in water.

Containers must pass extreme tests before being authorized: falls from several meters high, prolonged exposure to fire and violent shocks. The goal is to ensure that nuclear material remains isolated even in the event of serious accidents.

Added to these technical measures is a reinforced security component. When it comes to highly enriched uranium, The transfer usually takes place under strict state or military custody. Deliveries may include armed escorts, confidential routes, constant monitoring and teams of specialists in radioprotection.

The process also involves the presence of nuclear engineers and radiation safety expertsresponsible for supervising the handling of the material and verifying that all international standards are met.

In theory, transporting 450 kilos of uranium enriched to 60% which are attributed to Iran It would not require a large loading volume, since the material takes up relatively little space. However, doing so in the midst of a current armed conflict would add considerable complexity: first the nuclear facilities would have to be secured, possible damage from bombings would have to be assessed, and then technical protocols would have to be applied to remove the material without causing radiological risks.

In summary, Seizing and transferring enriched uranium from underground facilities in a country at war would be an enormously difficult logistical and scientific operation.even if they comply with international protocols designed to handle this type of materials.

Another option would be dilute highly enriched uranium in the same place where it is founda procedure known in the nuclear field as downblending.

This process consists of mix enriched uranium with natural or depleted uranium to reduce the concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235, bringing it to levels that can no longer be used to make nuclear weapons.

The technique has precedents in international disarmament programs and is carried out under strict security and verification protocols established by the IAEA.

However, applying it to nuclear facilities within a country at war would involve a considerable technical challenge, as it would require secure access to the plants, specialized equipment and the presence of nuclear engineers to supervise the entire process.



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