“There is a high risk of internal war in the Jalisco New Generation Cartel after the death of El Mencho”

According to General Ricardo Trevilla Trejo, Secretary of National Defense, the location of El Mencho It came to fruition after following and identifying one of his girlfriends. She was in the property of Tapalpa and left the place one day before the operation.

SEE ALSO: How ‘El Mencho’ built the most powerful cartel in Mexico and what can happen after his death

With air support from helicopters and planes, Army and National Guard forces carried out the intervention in the home.

Upon detecting the military presence, the armed group that protected the capo responded with a “very violent” attack, which left eight alleged criminals dead and three soldiers injured.

After the first confrontation, ‘El Mencho’ fled towards a wooded area, where a second exchange of fire took place, during which a military helicopter was hit and had to make an emergency landing.

The CJNG leader was injured and arrested, but He died from his injuries while being transported by military plane to a hospital. in Morelia.

After his death they registered road and avenue blockades, vehicle fires and shootings against businesses and public buildings in 20 Mexican states, generating panic. At least 25 members of the National Guard and 30 criminals died in these events.

About the consequences of the death of the head of the most powerful and violent cartel in Mexico, El Comercio spoke with the international analyst Francesco Tucciprofessor of Political Science and International Relations at the Peruvian University of Applied Sciences (UPC).

—What does the death of El Mencho really mean for the structure of the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel, considered the strongest organized crime group in Mexico?

The death of el Mencho significantly weakens the pyramidal structure of the CJNG, the most powerful cartel in Mexico with a presence in 24 states of the Federation, since its centralized leadership depended on its charismatic and operational figure. Without a clear family heir – his son “el Menchito” is in prison – the group could fragment into autonomous cells like local franchises. This does not immediately dismantle it, but it exposes vulnerabilities in its aggressive expansion of drug trafficking, extortion and fentanyl.

— Does the CJNG lose real capacity after the fall of its leader or do you think it was already prepared for an internal transition?

The CJNG does not lose immediate real capacity, since it already showed preparation for transitions with operational leaders such as “el 03” (Valencia González), Gonzalo Mendoza Gaytán (“el Sapo”) or Ricardo Ruiz Velasco (“el Doeble R”), supported by relatives of El Mencho. Its “franchise” model allows continuity in key locations such as ports and chemical precursor routes. However, the absence of a unified command could reduce its cohesion in the medium term.

—Is there an internal war coming over the succession within the CJNG? Could the same thing happen to the Sinaloa Cartel after the fall of El Chapo Guzmán?

There is a high risk of internal war over succession, similar to the Sinaloa Cartel after the fall of El Chapo in 2016, where factions such as Chapitos vs. Mayos generated fragmentation and violence. It is the worst scenario considered by specialists due to the violence it would generate: possible contenders such as “El Sapo” (with family support) and “El Jardinero” could clash for control in Jalisco and Colima, dissolving the central command into rival groups. The recent wave of post-El Mencho blockades and vehicle burnings indicates initial tensions.

—What risks exist that other criminal groups take advantage of this vacuum to dispute strategic territories?

Other groups such as remnants of the Sinaloa Cartel (Mayos or Chapitos), United Cartels or local ones in Michoacán and Guerrero could dispute strategic territories such as Manzanillo (for chemical precursors) and fentanyl routes. The CJNG already took advantage of the Sinaloa war in 2024-2025; Now, its emptiness invites counterattacks in Guanajuato, Zacatecas and the Pacific. This could generate unexpected tactical alliances or escalations in disputed places.

— Does this coup strengthen the security strategy of the Mexican government or could it generate a rebound effect with more violence in the short term?

The elimination of El Mencho appears to strengthen the Mexican security strategy by eliminating the US priority leader, with binational cooperation that assisted the operation. However, it generates a rebound effect with immediate violence: blockades, fires and transportation suspensions in multiple states. Furthermore, the cartel could collapse, facilitating the formation of small factions involved in conflicts to control territory and the market.

—What signs should the Mexican State observe in the coming weeks to anticipate an escalation of violence?

The Mexican State should assume that there will be recurring road blockades, burning of vehicles and drug “red codes” in Jalisco, Michoacán and Guanajuato. Other alerts to take into account: increase in selective homicides against CJNG operators, disputes in key plazas via drones (signal intelligence – SIGINT), and spikes in seizures of precursors in ports. An increase in internal betrayals or alliances with Sinaloan rivals would indicate violent fragmentation.

— Does the death of El Mencho change the political narrative between the White House and the Mexican government regarding the fight against drug trafficking and fentanyl trafficking?

Yes, the narrative is likely to change: Mencho was a key target of the White House for fentanyl, and his death validates Trump’s pressure on Mexico for “additional efforts” in 2026. It reduces tensions by showing concrete results of shared intelligence, strengthening the joint fight against drug trafficking. However, the physical elimination of a boss does not automatically lead to the fall of the cartel and can generate disastrous effects such as its fragmentation and subsequent violent struggle for power.

—Could this fact be a point of rapprochement between the presidents of Mexico and the United States?

This fact could be a point of rapprochement between the presidents of Claudia Sheinbaum and Donald Trump, by offering Mexico a victory over demands for direct intervention. It facilitates dialogues on extraditions and financial blockades to the CJNG, mitigating threats of “serious consequences” due to the entry of fentanyl into the United States. The joint statements of the leaders in the coming weeks that could confirm this possible rapprochement should be taken into account.