LOOK: Israel announces airstrikes in Lebanon to prevent “major attacks” by Hezbollah
As of this writing, the announced Iranian revenge has not materialized. And it is unlikely to happen. At least not in conventional terms. The threat is in the air, but the unknown is how it will come about.
On July 30, Israel launched a targeted strike against a building in a Beirut suburb. Three civilians were killed, as well as Fuad Shukr, the head of Hezbollah’s military wing and considered the number two in the Lebanese extremist organization. For Iran, which protects, arms and finances Hezbollah, it was an affront. But it did not stop there. The next day, Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyah, the political leader of Hamas, the Palestinian organization at war with Israel, in Tehran.
Since then, Western intelligence sources have been leaking information that points to an imminent Iranian attack on Israeli territory. The Ayatollahs’ regime did so for the first time last April, in retaliation for the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, the Syrian capital, which killed seven members of the Revolutionary Guard.
The offensive, then, seemed to be only a timid warning from Iran, as it deployed some 300 drones and missiles that were easily intercepted by Israel’s powerful anti-missile shield. An extremely calculated warning, which was also announced, but which showed the world that Iran is capable of attacking.
Months later, the same question is being asked again. Will Iran launch a direct attack? Killing the Hamas leader on his own soil not only shows the shortcomings of Iranian intelligence and security, but also leaves a trail of doubt in its own population, which not only continues to suffer economic hardship due to Western sanctions, but recently elected the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian as the country’s new president.
A portrait of slain Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh is pictured during a rally in the Lebanese coastal city of Sidon, on August 2, 2024. (Photo by Mahmoud ZAYYAT / AFP)
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Thus, Iran not only has to flex its muscles before the world and the Middle East, but also before its citizens, but it must watch its step because it knows that attacking Israel means direct intervention by the United States.
Iranian proxies
Over the past decades, Iran has been able to create a network of armed groups in the region with the aim of spreading the Islamic revolution and attacking targets through them without holding them directly responsible.
Thus, in the 1980s, Hezbollah was formed in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. The former is undoubtedly its most important operational arm, not only because of the funding and military aid it receives, but because it is a Shiite organization, the branch of Islam promoted by Iran.
Since the 2000s, Iran has decided to expand further by forming, through the Quds Force, pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, which have been key to understanding Iran’s current geopolitical power and which have grown in number and influence over time.
These are not small terrorist groups, but strategic groups that are already working on their own local agendas, which is making them increasingly dangerous. The Houthis in Yemen, for example, have entered into a war against a coalition led by Saudi Arabia (a rival of Iran), but they are also engaged in attacks in the Red Sea (including with drones and missiles) that do not necessarily pass through Tehran’s approval.
A person watches Houthi military spokesman Yahya Sarea deliver a televised statement about a new missile attack on a US ship, in Sanaa, Yemen, on January 31, 2024. (Photo by EFE/EPA/YAHYA ARHAB)
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In the case of Hamas, although Israel has claimed that the October 7 attacks were orchestrated from Iran, it is now known that the masterminds planned them alone so that no information could be leaked.
As a report by the Italian Institute for International Policy Studies (ISPI) notes, Iran remains firmly at the centre of this armed constellation but its proxies “are increasingly developing direct links with each other.” “Patterns of military dependency and assistance are emerging in the network, with Hezbollah playing a kind of mentoring role with respect to the other groups, especially with regard to military training,” the document notes.
Pressures
As we have already mentioned, what happened at the end of June with the deaths of the military chief of Hezbollah and the political leader of Hamas could be a turning point for Iran to decide to personally avenge its main support groups in the Middle East.
But the regime has no plans to take the war to its own territory, and Israel has no plans to invade Iran, no matter how powerful it is. But its proxies may have other plans. Hezbollah has been exchanging attacks with Israel for weeks on Lebanon’s southern border, and the death of its number two would not go unpunished, at least for the group’s most extremist militants.
Meanwhile, Hamas is reportedly pressuring Iran – according to the Israeli press – to attack Israel immediately in retaliation for the death of Haniyah, something that has not happened yet until something concrete comes out of the negotiations being held in Qatar to reach a truce in Gaza.
INTERVIEW
“The consequences are so great that it is difficult to believe that the Iranians will actually carry it out.”
Dr. Mohamed-Badine El Yattioui
Professor of Strategic Studies at the National Defence College of the United Arab Emirates.
- Is this warning that Iran plans to directly attack Israel a real threat?
The threat is real, but the question within the Iranian political and security system is whether that is the best option, because the consequences of attacking Israeli territory directly mean that the US will get involved and that could lead to a conflict and a greater destabilization of the entire Middle East. The threat is there, but the consequences are so great that it is difficult to believe that the Iranians will actually carry it out.
- Although Iran has the Revolutionary Guard and significant military forces, entering into an open war with Israel would not be in its interest…
The challenge and the problem for Ayatollah Khamenei and the entire Iranian political system is to maintain their credibility. Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyah was assassinated in the Iranian capital, and that means a real problem of legitimacy and credibility inside and outside Iran. Many people outside Iran, especially the Shiites living in the region, want a strong response. A response has become necessary, but it is all about how they will handle it and the level of intensity. That is the dilemma for the Iranians.
- What could be a more concrete response from Iran?
I think that the most realistic and feasible thing would be for Iran to attack Israeli interests outside of Israel and not attack them directly. There is a very strong doctrine developed over the last few months, which is the doctrine of “the new equation” which states that any foreign attack on Iranian territory will have an obligatory response from the government of Tehran, but in practice it would be very difficult to achieve this.
- And what could be the consequences if Iranian-funded armed groups in the region decide to take action?
It will be interesting how these groups will act. The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is very strong, they have the same ideology, as well as the same vision of Shiism (the branch of Islam practiced in Iran). When we talk about the Houthis in Yemen, the vision of Shiism on a religious level is different, and the Houthi movement has a very different relationship with Iran. They are more autonomous, and we have already seen this in the attacks they carry out in the Red Sea and even in how they have attacked Israeli targets. There are other Shiite groups in Iraq that also have a form of autonomy and a different vision of Iranian Shiism. So, these paramilitary groups could try to attack Israel on their own, and that would generate much more tension in the region, because if Iran cannot control or limit their actions, it would be worse for the security of the Middle East.
